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Abstract 
 
The cognitive abilities explained by cognitive science and cognitive semantics can 
inform us concerning the use of metaphors in science. The thesis is that abstract ideas 
rest on experiences of the concrete world. In this paper I will explain the use of 
conceptual metaphors in science, with examples from the mechanistic worldview of 
the 17th and 18th century. If we proceed from the way people think in general, their 
mental abilities, reason and cognition, we could get close to an understanding of how 
scientists during the scientific revolution shaped their ideas about the invisible 
geometry of matter. This is a cognitive history of ideas. What is called the ‘cognitive 
turn’ in the humanities has generated vigorous growth of research, for example, in 
cognitive poetics, neuroaesthetics, and cognitive anthropology. These approaches try 
to arrive at an understanding of creative processes. In the historical sciences there is 
also a growing interest in cognitive-historical analyses, particularly in archaeology 
and history of science. The aim of the cognitive history of science is to reconstruct 
scientific thinking on the basis of cognitive theories. The starting point for a 
cognitive history of ideas that I defend here is that philosophy, science, and 
mathematics do not really happen just in texts, in language, in laboratories, or in 
social contexts, but in brains and minds in interaction with the world around the 
subject, and are thus connected to the body, to perception, thoughts, and feelings. We 
humans are captured in our brains situated in the world, we are dependent on our 
thoughts and senses, our prior knowledge, our mental images, when we try to create 
a picture of the world. Science, in other words, is shaped by our distinctive way of 
reasoning, not least in metaphors. 
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Introduction 
 
Cognitive history concerns how humans in the past used their cognitive abilities in 
order to understand the world around them and to orient themselves in it, but also 
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how the world outside their bodies affected their way of thinking. The objective of 
this paper is to lay the theoretical basis for a cognitive approach to history, providing 
the tools for a cognitive history that can be tested on the historical sources in order to 
providing new insights into how people in history perceived their world as a result of 
an interaction between mind and its environment. This approach has also 
interdisciplinary consequences. A cognitive history can provide empirical historical 
data to the research into the biocultural co-evolution of human cognition. 
 
There are three steps towards a cognitive history. First, we have to lay the theoretical 
foundations for a cognitive approach to history, a new historical theory and method 
enlightened by cognitive science. If cognitive science is right in its claims concerning 
human thinking, then its theories must also be valid for people in history with whom 
we share same cognitive abilities. The second step would be to test the theories of 
cognitive science on the historical sources to ascertain whether they lead to new 
explanations and a deeper understanding of human cognitive creativity in history. By 
these cognitive theories we can open up the hidden thought processes of humans in 
the past and come closer to an understanding of how people thought, not only what 
they thought, and further study the interaction between the human mind and the 
surrounding world. The most ambitious step, the third step, is in the long run also to 
inform the research on the cognitive evolution of the human mind. History can, I 
believe, contribute to cognitive science and provide empirical historical data 
concerning how human cognition is a result of time, of history, personal and 
collective memories, and as a result of the human mind’s interaction with its specific 
environment in time and space.  
 
The first step, that of identifying plausible theories for a cognitive history, is not 
enough.These theories should also begin doing some work; it must be possible to 
implement themon the historical sources. A new theory for historical research is of 
no use if it cannot show any new results, give new explanations and enhance our 
understanding of the human past. In the long run, this enterprise can contribute to the 
research on the evolution of cognition, and, as it were, connect Palaeolithic man with 
the postmodern by studying the cultural evolution and its impact on human 
cognition. 
 
In order to exemplify the concepts involved, I have chosen examples from the early 
modern period, that especially was crucial for the emergence of modern scientific 
thought, but I believe that it could and should be possible to implement a cognitive-
historical method on any kind of historical period, topic or material. The early 
modern period was a time in human history when modern science began to take 
shape. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, human beings showed a 
growing interest in the world around them. A new knowledge of nature was acquired, 
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efficient mathematical tools were constructed and inexorable mechanical laws were 
introduced. The labyrinths of the human body were mapped; merchants and explorers 
set foot in foreign lands, and plants and animals were classified in an all-
encompassing system. Humankind sought an order in the world, an assumption that 
the effect followed the cause, and that nothing happens arbitrarily. In order to 
understand the world around them, they used their cognitive capacities that had 
gradually been evolving for millions of years.  
 
Metaphors of the mind 
 
The cognitive abilities explained by cognitive science and cognitive semantics can 
inform us concerning the use of metaphors in science. The thesis, proposed in 
cognitive semantics, is that abstract ideas rest on experiences of the concrete world. 
If we proceed from the way people think in general, their mental abilities, reason and 
cognition, in other words, if we consider how people think, not just what they think, 
we could get close to an understanding of how they shaped their ideas about the 
world. This is a cognitive history of ideas, a history of thinking. What is called the 
‘cognitive turn’ in the humanities has generated vigorous growth of research into 
different cognitive explanatory models of human expressions and cultural evolution, 
for example, in cognitive poetics, neuroaesthetics, and cognitive anthropology.1 
These approaches are combined in a theory of cognitive science in order to arrive at 
an understanding of creative processes. In the historical sciences there is also a 
growing interest in cognitive-historical analyses, particularly in archaeology and 
history of science.2 The aim of the cognitive history of science suggested here is to 
reconstruct scientific thinking on the basis of cognitive theories.3 Research in 
                                                     
1 Scott Atran, Cognitive Foundations of Natural History: Towards an Anthropology of Science 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990); Michael Tomasello, The Cultural Origins of Human 
Cognition (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1999); Mark Turner, ‘The Cognitive Study of Art, 
Language, and Literature’, Poetics Today, 2002, 1:9–22; Alan Richardson & Francis F. Steen, 
‘Literature and the Cognitive Revolution: An Introduction’, Poetics Today, 2002, 1:1–8; Michael 
Tomasello, ‘Uniquely Human Cognition Is a Product of Human Culture’, Evolution and Culture: A 
Fryssen Foundation Symposium, eds. S. C. Levinson & P. Jaisson (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2005), 
p. 203–217; Scott Atran & Douglas L. Medin, The Native Mind and the Cultural Construction of Nature 
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2008); Brian Boyd, On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and 
Fiction (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009); Denis Dutton, The Art 
Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009). 
2 Steven Mithen, The Prehistory of the Mind: The Cognitive Origins of Art, Religion, and Science 
(London: Thames & Hudson, 1996); Colin Renfrew, Chris Frith & Lambros Malafouris (eds.), The 
Sapient Mind: Archaeology Meets Neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009). 
3 Nancy J. Nersessian, ‘How do Scientists Think? Capturing the Dynamics of Conceptual Change in 
Science’, Cognitive Models of Science, ed. R. N. Giere (Minneapolis MN: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 
1992), p. 4–7, 36–38; Nancy J. Nersessian, ‘Opening the Black Box: Cognitive Science and History of 
Science’, Osiris, 1995, p. 194–211; Nancy J. Nersessian, ‘Interpreting Scientific and Engineering 
Practices: Integrating the Cognitive, Social, and Cultural Dimensions’, Scientific and Technological 
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cognitive history has generally dealt with the fundamental cognitive practices such as 
reading and counting, as well as scientific and religious perceptions.4 
 
There are at least three assumptions about thought that a cognitive history of ideas 
can rest on. In cognitive science it has been ascertained, firstly, that our concepts and 
reason are associated with and structured by the body, the brain, and our everyday 
action in the world.5 Mind is embodied, situated and distributed. Space, the 
environment in which we live, the registration of the senses, and the movement of the 
body through the physical landscape, all are significant for thought. Secondly, it has 
been shown that most of our thinking takes place without us being aware of it. There 
are unconscious cognitive processes to which the conscious mind has no access, such 
as memories, mental images, conclusions, and perceptions of meanings. The 
unconscious conceptual system structures our conscious thought. Thirdly, reason is 
metaphorical, that is, abstract concepts are understood in terms of concrete ones, as 
conceptual metaphors allow us to think about one thing with the aid of something 
else. Based on a knowledge of the known, we draw conclusions about the unknown.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
Thinking, eds. M. E. Gorman et al. (Mahwah NJ: L. Erlbaum, 2005); see also E. Thomas Lawson, 
‘Counterintuitive Notions and the Problem of Transmission: The Relevance of Cognitive Science for the 
Study of History’, Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historique, 1994, 3:481–495; David Gooding, 
‘Cognitive History of Science: The Roles of Diagrammatic Representations in Discovery and Modeling 
Discovery’, Theory and Application of Diagrams (Berlin: Springer, 2000); Ryan D. Tweney, ‘Scientific 
Thinking: A Cognitive-Historical Approach’, Designing for Science: Implications from Everyday, 
Classroom, and Professional Settings, eds. K. Crowley, C. D. Schunn & T. Okada (Mahwah NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2001), p. 141–173; Peter Carruthers, Stephen Stich & Michael Siegal 
(eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002); Christophe Heintz, 
‘Introduction: Why There Should Be a Cognitive Anthropology of Science’, Journal of Cognition and 
Culture, 2004, 3:391–408; E. Thomas Lawson, ‘The Wedding of Psychology, Ethnography, and 
History: Methodological Bigamy or Tripartite Free Love?’, Theorizing Religions Past: Archaeology, 
History, and Cognition, eds. H. Whitehouse & L. H. Martin (Walnut Creek CA: AltaMira Press, 2004), 
p. 1–5; Harvey Whitehouse, ‘Cognitive Historiography: When Science Meets Art’, Historical 
reflections/Réflexions historiques, 2005, 2:307–318. 
4 David R. Olson, The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and 
Reading (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996); Reviel Netz, The Shaping of Deduction in Greek 
Mathematics: A Study in Cognitive History (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999); Hanne 
Andersen, Peter Barker & Xiang Chen, The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006); Luther H. Martin & Jesper Sørensen, Past Minds: Studies in Cognitive 
Historiography (London: Equinox Publishing, 2011). 
5 George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to 
Western Thought (New York NY: Basic Books, 1999), p. 3, 7, 10; Mark Johnson, The Body in the 
Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (Chicago IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 
1987); Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson & Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science 
and Human Experience (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1991); John Krois et al. (eds.), Embodiment in 
Cognition and Culture (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2007); Paco Calvo & Toni Gomila (eds.), 
Handbook of Cognitive Science: An Embodied Approach (Oxford: Elsevier Science, 2008). 
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The starting point for a cognitive history of ideas that I defend here is that 
philosophy, science, and mathematics do not really happen just in texts, in language, 
in laboratories, or in social contexts, but in brains and minds in interaction with the 
world around the subject, and are thus connected to the body, to perception, thoughts, 
and feelings. We humans are captured in our brains situated in the world, we are 
dependent on our thoughts and senses, our prior knowledge, our mental images, 
when we try to create a picture of the world. Science, in other words, is shaped by 
our distinctive way of reasoning, not least in metaphors.  
 
In cognitive semantics, as represented by George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and others, 
certain conclusions have been drawn from assumptions in cognitive science about the 
way humans think. One feature that has been seized on is the fact that humans think 
metaphorically. Our basic concepts do not function beyond our everyday 
experiences. To conceptualize non-everyday phenomena or abstract thoughts 
requires conceptual metaphors. Metaphor can then mean understanding and 
experiencing something with the aid of something else, or that a structure in one 
domain is transferred to another, from a source (the sensorimotor domain) to a target 
(subjective experience) which simultaneously preserves the deductive structure. 
Metaphors entail conceptualizing something in terms of some other thing, and 
function in a way as models for less well-known areas. We transfer knowledge about 
the known to the unknown, from the familiar to the unfamiliar, from the 
commonplace world, society, human life, engineering and handicraft, to the invisible 
particle world, to the soul and God. One could say that metaphorical thought means 
finding similarities between things, but also forgetting dissimilarities, being able to 
generalize and abstract. The creation and use of metaphors requires creativity and 
imagination. 
 
Many of our fundamental concepts are organized on the basis of one or more spatial 
metaphors.6 There are metaphors that transfer a structure, or proceed from a spatial 
orientation that arises from the action of the body in physical reality. Our experiences 
of physical objects give rise to ontological metaphors, that is, seeing events, 
emotions, ideas, and states as objects, entities, substances, or containers. They can be 
metaphors such as imagining life as a journey or intellectual influence as a physical 
force. Time can be understood spatially as something flowing along a line or in a 
circle. Thinking can be described in terms of movement, moving forward step by 
step without skipping any stages, or taking the straightest course to the conclusion 
without going in circles or getting away from the subject. To think is to travel. It is a 
walk along a path, a voyage on the sea, a journey with or without a goal. The 
                                                     
6George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 
14, 17, 25, 30; cf. Peter Gärdenfors, Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought (Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press, 2000), p. 2, 255. 
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researcher can get lost in the labyrinth of reality. He cannot find the narrow trail out 
of the jungle, he can be driven off course on the ocean of knowledge, or after much 
searching he may find the straight road towards the goal, ‘truth’. The landscape with 
its settlement, habitability, shifts of light and shade, also gives conceptual patterns. 
Wilderness and darkness are ignorance and irrationality. Fortified castles and light 
represent sure knowledge and wisdom. To think is also to see. Knowledge is vision. 
What is unknown, difficult to comprehend, is obscure darkness. Without knowledge 
we grope in the dark. To acquire knowledge is to shed light on things, a knowledge 
that enables us to see and allows new findings to see the light of day. Knowledge 
brings enlightenment, we see, feel, everything is clear. What is significant and 
important is of greater weight or size. Similarity is understood as physical nearness, 
difficulties are burdens, and organizational structures are like physical structures. 
These metaphors are used unconsciously, automatically in everyday life and arise 
from our quotidian experience. Without metaphors, abstract reasoning would be 
impossible.7 
 
Metaphorical concepts have their origin not just in our physical but also in our 
cultural experience. The more layers of metaphors we employ, the more abstract and 
culturally specific the concept becomes.8 Some metaphors proceed from some 
special cultural knowledge, for example metaphors based on Euclidean geometry. 
People who live in cultures with no knowledge of Euclidean geometry would not 
understand such metaphors. Euclidean geometry gives the world a specific visual 
metaphorical structure, a world of relations between points, lines, and circles. In 
many cases, then, scientific theories and concepts about the world are founded on 
spatial metaphors with a physical and cultural origin. Philosophers and natural 
scientists use the same conceptual system as ordinary people in their own culture. In 
philosophical theories they incorporate the concepts available in the historical 
context and the general theories, models, and metaphors that are common and typical 
in the culture to which they belong, but they also rework these basic concepts, see 
new links, and draw new conclusions. It is the shared concepts and ideas that make a 
specific philosophical theory comprehensible to people within a particular culture. 
Philosophical theories can be interpreted as attempts to refine, expand, clarify, and 
make consistent certain common metaphors and ‘popular’ or ‘general’ theories 
shared by people in a culture. What a particular philosophical theory also does is to 
select the ‘right’ metaphors. Differences between philosophical views thus depend on 
different choices of metaphors. Each philosopher’s metaphysics has its origin in what 
                                                     
7 Lakoff & Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, p. 59; George Lakoff & Rafael E. Núñez, Where 
Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being (New York NY: 
Basic Books, 2000), p. 41. 
8 Marcel Danesi, ‘The Dimensionality of Metaphor’, Sign Systems Studies, 1999, 27:60–87, on p. 73–
74, 78. 
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he takes as central metaphors. A ‘world-view’ can therefore be regarded as a 
consistent constellation of concepts, especially metaphorical concepts, over one or 
more conceptual domains.9 The world-view is the reality for the people of its time.  
In philosophical analysis and scientific theory formation, then, metaphors play an 
important part. Philosophical and scientific texts are more or less strewn with 
metaphors, analogies, metonymies, similes, and comparisons. In the history of 
science they have often been dismissed as unscientific and uninteresting adornment.10 
They have mostly been regarded as poetic whims, educational and rhetorical devices, 
or simply as superfluous linguistic expressions that obscure the view of the true 
logical structure of the scientific arguments, the purely rational scientific and 
mathematical. Against this I claim that metaphors, the linguistic form, the tropes that 
modify the basic meaning of a word, are of crucial importance. They are not mere 
external ornament, but a major part of creative thought by establishing visual 
analogies and abstract ideas. For this reason they also provide valuable clues to how 
scientists think. Scientific reasoning uses metaphors to a great extent as conceptual 
tools or as theoretical models of the external world. Structural metaphors and process 
metaphors are particularly common in scientific reasoning, metaphors that try to get 
away from the emotional and subjective. In science one must form new concepts for 
the new phenomena one is describing, and this is often done with the aid of 
metaphors related to what is already known.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We can divide the cognitive-historical agenda into three undertakings: i) to delve into 
the current theories of cognitive science, to evaluate and select the most useful 
theories for historical research; ii) to collect historical data that is representative, 
challenging and relevant; and iii) to implement the cognitive theories on the collected 
data, and through this produce new interpretations and theories, that push the field 
forward.  
 
If this fails, then either (i) the theories and results of cognitive science are false, or 
(ii) the theories and results of cognitive science are not relevant for historical 
research. An answer to the first option is that the theories and results of cognitive 
science are well grounded; there are many experimental proofs that have been 
carefully checked. If we believe in the scientific enterprise, we can rule out the first 
explanation. If cognitive science turns out to be completely wrong in its 
                                                     
9 Lakoff & Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, p. 338–341, 511. 
10 There are of course exceptions, see Alistair C. Crombie, Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European 
Tradition: The History of Argument and Explanation Especially in the Mathematical and Biomedical 
Sciences and Arts II (London: Duckworth, 1994), part IV; Marta Spranzi, ‘Galileo and the Mountains of 
the Moon: Analogical Reasoning, Models and Metaphors in Scientific Discovery’, Journal of Cognition 
and Culture, 2004, 3:451–483. 
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proclamations, human beings still use categories, metaphors and objects, etc. in their 
daily lives and in science. This fact still needs an explanation. Turning to the second 
option; if these theories and results of cognitive science are universal and valid for all 
humans, this must also include our immediate ancestors in our own species (they 
must reasonably have had brains). If this is not so, I cannot find any explanation for 
this other than that the cognitive historian has not yet convinced other historians 
about it by showing new results that inspire new research on other topics.  
  
My conclusion is that cognitive history is a promising approach for future historical 
research. First, a cognitive approach to history will give us new tools for analyzing 
and interpreting ideas in history, explaining events and historical change, and enable 
us understand in greater detail how people thought, felt and believed as historical 
beings situated in time and space, and by this enlighten the interaction between the 
mind and its surroundings. In all, it will let us enter the black box of hidden cognitive 
processes of human minds in history.  
 
Secondly, with a new cognitive-historical method, new sources will be sought and 
discovered; material that before seemed to be hard to use will now be useful, and 
well-known sources must be re-interpreted. Successful new methods provide not 
only new interpretations and explanations, they discover new facts, use known 
sources in a new way and discover new sources that can be used in historical 
research. An empirical cognitive history will explain the cognitive processes behind 
human encounters with the surrounding world, what happened to the mind in 
unknown environments, how mental images in science and technology were used, 
how objects and techniques enhanced thinking in science, and unveiling the 
metaphorical thinking behind concept formation and the categorization strategies in 
systematics and taxonomy. In all, such cognitive-historical studies will give new 
explanations to the emergence of human thinking as an interaction between the mind 
and the world. 
 
Thirdly, with a cognitive theory, history will contribute to the ongoing research in 
cognitive science and on cultural evolution. We will arrive at an interdisciplinary 
historical theory integrated with our collected knowledge. History cannot only 
borrow and learn something from other disciplines; it will also contribute to the 
them, and provide important data that will give the clues as how our distant ancestors 
thousands of years ago gradually enhanced their cognitive abilities and techniques 
and finally gave birth to us, we postmodern thinking, feeling, and living beings. 
 
The cognitive history outlined hereinrepresents an open field of possibilities. It will 
take time to explore its vast territory, that is for sure, and the enterprise will require 
hordes of historians to be occupied for decades. But this endeavor must begin 
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someday. A cognitive history of ideas relates to the basic human conditions; it unites 
people in history that we have the experience of living, that we register and 
participate in the world around us – the flowing in the veins, the storms of emotions, 
and the escaping thoughts. It provides an understanding of the thoughts and lives of 
people in history, as sentient and reflective beings. It unveils the hidden thought 
processes in the past. 
